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Understanding Narrative 
Abstract 
Our ability to understand narratives—that is, our capacity for retelling them, paraphrasing them, 
summarizing them, expanding them, and specifying (at least some of) their points—is a function of our 
narrative competence. The latter is shown to include the following set of knowledges and abilities: (1) the 
knowledge that narrative consists of narrating (signs representing the narrating activity, its origin, and its 
destination) and narrated (signs representing real or fictive situations and events in a time sequence) and 
the ability to distinguish between the two; (2) the knowledge that the narrated describes changes of 
situations in time and that the preservation of its main chronological features is important for the 
preservation of its meaning; (3) the ability to focus on the narrating and, more particularly, on those 
evaluative statements pointing to a narrative lesson; (4) the ability to process the narrated in terms of a 
contrastive analysis; and (5) the ability to generalize the particulars depicted in the world of the narrated. 
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UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE 
GERALD PRINCE 
University of Pennsylvania 
We all know how to tell narratives more or less well; we tell 
them more or less frequently; and we distinguish them from non- 
narratives more or less strictly. In other words, we have certain in- 
tuitions (or have internalized certain rules) about what constitutes a 
narrative and what does not. Moreover, we often agree as to 
whether or not a given set of symbols is a narrative. Thus, Treasure 
Island, Perrault's «Little Red Riding Hood,» the Gospel passages 
about the Good Samaritan (Luke 10, 25-37), and even such in- 
significant texts as: 
(1) Mary was in excellent health then she got married and she 
became ill 
or 
(2) It was seven o'clock and the birds were singing and the 
bells were ringing but John felt lousy, then he saw Mary and 
he felt great 
are usually taken to be narratives. On the other hand, 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the Constitution of the United States, the 
1980 list of MLA members, and even such interesting texts as: 
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(4) There are no vitamins, minerals or shampoos that can 
stimulate hair growth 
are usually not. In fact, people with widely different cultural 
backgrounds often identify the same given sets of symbols as nar- 
ratives and consider others as non-narratives, and they often tell 
narratives that are very similar. Russian and North American In- 
dian folktales, for instance, were shown to have many features in 
common' and, more generally, any narrative is the representation 
of real or fictive situations and events in a time sequence. 
Besides, and this is saying much the same thing as the above, 
we can all understand narratives more or less fully. Specifically, we 
can answer correctly at least some questions about a given narrative 
and we can determine that at least some answers to these questions 
are incorrect (What was Little Red Riding Hood bringing her 
grandmother? A girdle cake with a little pot of butter and not fish 
and chips or corn on the cob! Who, according to the Gospel, 
helped the man lying half dead on the road? A Samaritan and not a 
Levite!); we can also retell that narrative, paraphrase it, summarize 
it, or expand it. Now, it is often-not to say always-the case that 
different individuals provide different retellings, paraphrases, ex- 
pansions, or summaries of the same narrative. If we asked a 
number of people to read a certain narrative and recount it to us or 
give us a summary of it,' for example, some of them might present 
the narrated situations and events in the order of their original tex- 
tual presentation and others might not; some might mention certain 
situations or events that others wouldn't; some might even in- 
troduce data not explicitly supplied in the original narrative; and 
some might give a very brief summary while others might provide a 
rather detailed one. Given (2), for instance, one account might look 
like: 
(5) It was quite early in the morning and the bells were ringing 
and the birds were singing and everything was beautiful but 
John felt lousy; then he saw Mary and he felt great 
while another might simply be 
(6) John felt very bad but then he felt very good because he 
saw Mary 2




and given the story of «The Good Samaritan,» we might get 
(7) A man was lying half dead in the road and a Samaritan 
came along and helped him 
or 
or 
(8) A man was lying half dead in the road but nobody helped 
him until, finally, a Samaritan came along and helped him 
(9) A man was lying half dead in the road and a priest came 
along but he did not help him; then a Levite came along but 
he did not help him either; then, finally, a Samaritan came 
along and helped him.' 
The variety of (possible) responses is clearly enormous. Yet certain 
kinds of response will most probably not occur; certain stretches of 
discourse will most probably not be advanced as retellings or sum- 
maries. Few people, if any, will offer: 
(10) It was seven o'clock and John felt great then he saw Mary 
and he felt lousy 
or 
(11) The birds were singing and the bells were ringing 
as a retelling of (2) and few will give: 
(12) A man was lying half dead in the road 
or 3
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(13) Fried rice is excellent 
as a summary of «The Good Samaritan.» Furthermore, not- 
withstanding the many differences to be found among the various 
responses, the latter will always carry some of the same informa- 
tion: (5) and (6), for example, both refer to an improvement in 
John's mood; (7), (8) and (9) all refer to somebody helping 
somebody else; and any retelling /summary of Perrault's «Little 
Red Riding Hood» would surely allude to the heroine's ultimate 
fate. 
Thus, in spite of the undeniable variations that obtain in 
understanding narrative (especially among people with different 
backgrounds, capacities and interests), we can point to a con- 
siderable amount of agreement (even among very different people). 
It seems, therefore, that not only do we all have certain intuitions 
(or know certain rules) about the nature of narratives and what 
they mean but also, to a certain extent at least, we all have the same 
intuitions and know the same rules. It is this set of rules and intui- 
tions-which I will call, from now on, narrative competence-that 
allows us, along with other competences (for instance, a linguistic 
one: I could not recount or understand a narrative in English if I 
did not know English), to produce and process narratives, to tell, 
retell, paraphrase, expand, summarize, and understand them in 
like manner. 
As an example of how narrative competence helps account for 
our understanding of narratives, I should first like to describe at 
least one or two of its features and focus on the operation of sum- 
marizing.' Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of narrative com- 
petence lies in the knowledge that narrative is, among many other 
things, a collection of signs which can be grouped into two main 
classes. Specifically, some constitute signs of the narrating (or nar- 
rating, for short) and represent the narrating activity (narration), 
its origin (narrator) and its destination (narratee). The others con- 
stitute signs of the narrated (or narrated, for short): they represent 
real or fictive events and situations in a time sequence. More 
specifically, the narrated represents a change or changes in one or 
more situations from a time to to a time ti. We all make a distinc- 
tion between the two sets of signs (this is, in part, what allows us to 
read a text «for the story» and not for the style, the wit, the in- 
genious commentary, etc.) and, in order to arrive at an adequate 
summary of a narrative, we need only reproduce its narrated. 5 4





(14) Mary, whom I am longing to discuss, had a lot of money, 
then Mary met a nasty man; then Mary-poor old 
Mary! -lost all of her money, 
for instance, 
(15) Mary had a lot of money, then Mary met a nasty man, 
then Mary lost all of her money 
constitutes an adequate summary. Of course, any paraphrase of the 
narrated would constitute an acceptable summary too: 
(16) Mary had a lot of money, then she met a nasty man, then 
she lost all of her money 
(17) Mary was very rich, then she met a nasty man, then she 
became poor. 
Knowing that the narrated describes changes of situations in 
time also has several consequences. Above all, it means that any 
summarizing (or expanding, or paraphrasing) requires the preser- 
vation of the chronology of situations and events depicted: (14) and 
(18) Mary was very poor, then she met a nasty man and 
became very rich 
tell rather different stories because their chronology differs and 
they consequently describe different changes; likewise, any sum- 
mary of «The Good Samaritan» such as 
(19) A Samaritan helped a man and then the man lay half 5
Prince: Understanding Narrative
Published by New Prairie Press
42 STCL., Vol. 6, Numbers 1&2 (Fall, 1981-Spring, 1982) 
dead in the road 
would surely not be thought acceptable whereas any summary in- 
dicating the original sequence of events would: consider (7), (8), 
(9), or 
(20) A Samaritan helped a man lying half dead in the road after 
several people had gone by without helping him. 
Furthermore, since the changes are very important, any situa- 
tion or event that is not particularly relevant to them can be 
eliminated from the summary (this is, in part, what allows us to 
skip, say, long descriptive passages in a novel which we are reading 
for the action, for the story). Specifically, any situation which is 
not modified, or is not the result of a modification, and any event 
or situation which is not (related to) a modifier are not very perti- 
nent in terms of change depiction and can thus be eliminated. For 
example, I can summarize (5) by producing 
(21) John felt lousy, then he saw Mary and he felt great, 
that is, by preserving the change depicted while eliminating those 
parts of the narrated that are not particularly relevant to the 
change.' 
Note that the very same features of narrative competence help 
account for the fact that a given narrative can be expanded and still 
«tell the same story»: after all, I can add many elements to its nar- 
rated, or its narrating, or both, without essentially altering the 
change(s) it describes. Given «The Good Samaritan,» for instance, 
and at the risk of turning it into a duller story, I could double the 
number of people who pass by the half dead man without helping 
him: 
(22) A man was lying half dead in the road and a priest came 
along but he did not help him; then a Levite came along but 6




he did not help him; then another priest came along and he 
did not help him; then another Levite came along and he did 
not help him either; then, finally, a Samaritan came along 
and helped him; 
and given (14), I could develop its narrating without crucially affec- 
ting the nature of the change depicted: 
(23) Mary, whom I am longing to discuss, had a lot of money 
then she met a nasty man whose name I don't even care 
about; then Mary-poor old Mary!-lost all of her money, 
yes, all of it. 
So far so good. Yet it might be pointed out that understanding 
a narrative is not only (or merely) being able to retell it, paraphrase 
it, expand it, and summarize it but also (and perhaps even more so) 
being able to give an account of its «message,» describe what (more 
or less) general subject or truth it illustrates, specify what «it is get- 
ting at,» put forth its point.' For example, it might be claimed- - 
quite appropriately!-that, regardless of how many adequate sum- 
maries or expansions of «Little Red Riding Hood» I could pro- 
duce, I still could not be said to understand the tale if I could not 
tell what practical lesson(s) it carried, what fundamental 
meaning(s) it developed («It is dangerous to stop and listen to a 
wolf»; «Little children should not talk to strangers»; and so on). 
Now, there may be perfectly well-formed narratives that (under 
most circumstances) have no «message,» illustrate no truth, make 
no point. Thus, something like 
(24) I got up then I went out and walked through the city for 
half-an-hour 
does not seem, in the present context, to illustrate very much else 
than the notion of pointless narrative and would not, I think, be 
considered particularly enlightening and exciting. Besides, there 
may be narratives whose only raison d'être is to report something 
worth reporting, something unusual, entertaining, terrifying, or 7
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wonderful, and whose only lessons are the lessons of narrativity 
itself (there are beginning and ends; what comes before determines 
what comes after and derives significance from it; distinct situa- 
tions and events can be linked in time and made to constitute a 
whole; they can also be detotalized into other situations and events; 
and so forth)." Yet there are undoubtedly many narratives which, 
like «Little Red Riding Hood,» teach other lessons. Understanding 
these narratives entails understanding their lessons. 
Accounting for how we reach such understanding might, in 
some cases, be possible without any recourse to a specifically nar- 
rative competence: simple linguistic competence would do. In La 
Fontaine's «Le Loup et l'Agneau,» for instance, the moral of the 
fable is presented at the very outset and anyone who reads French 
can understand it: «La raison du plus fort est toujours la 
meilleure»; similarly, (much of) what «The Good Samaritan» il- 
lustrates is stated quite explicitly in Luke 10, 25-37: the meaning 
(and importance) of loving one's neighbor as oneself; and, towards 
the very end of All the King's Men, several paragraphs summarize 
the novel for us and specify at least some of its lessons («This has 
been the story of Willie Stark, but it is my story, too. For I have a 
story. It is the story of a man . . .»). Indeed, what Labov calls an 
abstract, a short summary provided by the narrator and encap- 
sulating the point, is found relatively often in narrative. 
In numerous cases, however, no such abstract is supplied, no 
such explicit identification of the point is made. Consider «Little 
Red Riding Hood,» for example; nowhere in the body of the tale 
does the narrator present his moral directly. How is it, then, that 
we can understand this moral? Once again, certain aspects of our 
narrative competence can help provide an answer. Just as our abili- 
ty to focus on the situations and events depicted (the narrated) par- 
tially accounts for our summaries and expansions, our ability to 
concentrate on what I have called the narrating or on what Booth 
would call the rhetorical dimension of narrative, Genette the nar- 
rator's ideological function, Suleiman the interpretive function, 
and Labov evaluation allows us to get the point.' Evaluation con- 
sists of all the elements in a narrative indicating why it is worth tell- 
ing (what is special about it, important, remarkable), how the situa- 
tions and events depicted should be interpreted, which ones are 
most deserving of attention, what the goals of the narration are. In 
other words, evaluation is the sum of those elements that guide our 
understanding. As is well known, such elements and, more par- 
ticularly, direct statements by a narrator (what is also referred to as 8




direct commentary) abound in many narratives. They may remind 
us of information given previously; they may explain how newly- 
provided data are consistent with older data; they may take the 
form of an abstract, summarize a series of events, give the gist of a 
complex argument, indicate the relative significance of various ac- 
tions, reveal the symbolic properties of different situations, and so 
on. Simply by following these narrative guides, we can often 
discover the point. In «Little Red Riding Hood,» for instance, we 
are told not only that the heroine is exceedingly pretty, how she got 
her name, and why the wolf does not eat her when he meets her in a 
wood, but also that it is «dangerous to stop and listen to a wolf.» 
Now, the tale presents a little girl who listens to a wolf and is eaten 
by him: her fate must be the result of her transgression. 
But what about narratives-there are quite a few of them!-in 
which the narrator refrains from evaluative statements altogether 
or, at any rate, from such statements as indicate the meaning 
(rather than the importance) of an event or series of events. We 
then look for statements by (trustworthy) characters. Imagine, for 
example, a version of «Little Red Riding Hood» in which the nar- 
rator does not say anything about the danger of talking to a wolf 
but in which the heroine's mother does. And what about narratives 
in which no statements appear that comment directly on the mean- 
ing of the narrated? Consider a version of «Little Red Riding 
Hood» in which neither the narrator nor any of the characters men- 
tions the danger of talking to a wolf; or a version of «The Good 
Samaritan» in which no reference whatever is made to loving one's 
neighbor as oneself (in which the frame provided by Luke 10, 25-29 
and 36-37 is eliminated). We then concentrate on the characters 
that are most important (because they are textually prominent; 
because their situation and actions are foregrounded; because they 
are agents rather than patients) and we study their actions, their 
goals and the changes in their situation as well as the causes for 
these actions and changes or for reaching /not reaching these goals. 
In «Little Red Riding Hood,» two characters are particularly im- 
portant and each has a specific set of goals. The little girl wants to 
get to her grandmother's and deliver to her a girdlecake and a little 
pot of butter. The wolf wants to eat the little girl. She fails because 
she stops to talk with him and, following his advice, takes the 
longest way to arrive at her destination, «having a good time 
gathering hazel-nuts, running after butterflies, and making bou- 
quets out of the little flowers she saw.» He succeeds because, after 
resisting his impulse to eat her in the forest («he felt very much like 9
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eating her; but he did not dare because of some woodcutter»), he 
learns of her plans, persuades her to follow the longest way, takes 
the shortest way, arrives at the grandmother's first, manages to eat 
the good woman thanks to a disguise, and finally eats the heroine 
thanks to another disguise. Assuming a capacity for generalization, 
at least some of the possible lessons are rather clear: 
(25) It is dangerous to stop and listen to a wolf 
(26) Having too good a time on the way to your goal can 
make you lose sight of it 
(27) The ability to delay instant gratification and to disguise 
oneself can lead to fruitful results 
In «The Good Samaritan,» two of the three characters who see the 
man lying half dead in the road-the Levite and the priest-are said 
to be on that road by pure coincidence; furthermore, whatever goal 
they may want to reach is not specified. On the other hand, the 
Samaritan (the hero of the parable) is on a trip. The former do not 
stop to help. The latter does, dresses up the man's wounds, carries 
him to an inn, and takes care of him. One obvious message to be 
derived from this set of oppositions would be something like 
(28) Some people will stop and help you when you are in trou- 
ble even if it is an inconvenience for them; others won't even 
if there is no inconvenience 
But there is at least one more source or opposition in the parable. 
Of the four main characters, three are depicted in terms of social 
status or ethnic origin: the priest, the Levite and the Samaritan. 
The fourth character is simply described as a man (in need of help). 
A further lesson can be derived when this opposition is added to the 
earlier ones: 10




(29) Some people think that their greatest bond with other 
people is their common humanity and they act accordingly 
(they are right since they are like the Samaritan, that is, like 
the hero). Others do not (and they are wrong). 
In other words, a relatively simple contrastive analysis of the at- 
titudes, situations and events depicted in «Little Red Riding Hood» 
and «The Good Samaritan» yields lessons that are quite close to 
those explicitly provided in Perrault's text and in the Gospel. More 
generally, the processing of the narrated in other narratives along 
similar lines of analysis allows us to get to the point even when no 
abstract or commentary is provided to guide our interpretation.'° 
Note that many narratives do not lend themselves (well or at 
all) to such an analysis. In (14)-(17), for instance, we can contrast 
Mary's initial situation with her final one, but we cannot compare 
either of them with another character's situation; and in (24), there 
is even less to compare or contrast. Such narratives may not have 
any (inherent) point (apart from the points of narrativity itself) 
and, if they do, their point can be grasped only through an ex- 
amination of the context of their production/reception or through 
a (partial) generalization of the particulars they describe. Given 
(14)-(17), for example, we can generalize Mary's experience as 
or 
(30) Women who have money lose it because of men 
(31) Some women with money are the victims of nasty men; 
and given (24), a context in which it is claimed that nobody dares to 
walk through the city anymore would yield something like the 
following point: 
(32) Some people (I!) still dare to walk through the city. 
Note also that the ability to derive (some of) the point(s) of a 11
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narrative through a constrastive analysis of the narrated or a 
generalization of the changes it describes partly explains how we 
know whether or not the narrative can appropriately be told in a 
particular context: given a situation in which several people are 
trading stories about car accidents, it would not be very cooperative 
to tell (14)-(17); and given a situation in which every participant is 
supposed to extol the acumen of children or the kindness of 
Levites, it would not by quite friendly to recount the events of «Lit- 
tle Red Riding Hood» or those of «The Good Samaritan.» Further- 
more, the same ability explains in part how we assess the coherence 
of a specific narrative and how we determine the reliability of a par- 
ticular narrator. If the lesson provided by evaluative statements 
and the lesson derived through an analysis of the narrated are 
similar, the narrative will be judged more superficially coherent 
(but not necessarily better!) than if they are not. Likewise, if the 
point explicitly made by the narrator is repeatedly contradicted by 
the narrated, we will conclude that we cannot take his statements at 
face value. 
Finally, note that my (very sketchy) analyses of «Little Red 
Riding Hood» and «The Good Samaritan» have in no way been 
said to have yielded all of the points made by the parable and by the 
tale. Nor have I claimed that different people's understanding of 
these (or other) narratives would necessarily be the same. Indeed, I 
have tried to suggest otherwise by listing (25)-(27) as possible 
lessons derived from Perrault and (28)-(29) as possible truths 
presented in Luke. Similarly, it should be clear from my presenta- 
tion that different contexts for the production /reception of a nar- 
rative, which function as so many different sets of evaluative 
statements, may lead to different conclusions about the point(s) 
made by the narrative: recounting «Little Red Riding Hood» to a 
pack of wolves is not quite the same as recounting it to a group of 
little girls; and «The Good Samaritan» might very well illustrate 
rather different truths in different circumstances (though I cannot 
imagine too many contexts in which it would be considered an in- 
dictment of compassion for our fellow human beings). In other 
words, my discussion attempts to explain how it is that we under- 
stand stories in similar ways but it also attempts to make room for 
divergences. 
In short, our narrative competence, our ability to understand 
narratives-that is, our capacity for retelling them, paraphrasing 
them, summarizing them, expanding them, and specifying (at least 
some of) their points-includes the following set of knowledges 12




and abilities: (1) the knowledge that narrative is made up of nar- 
rating and narrated and the ability to distinguish between the two; 
(2) the knowledge that the narrated describes changes of situations 
in time and that the preservation of its main chronological features 
is important for the preservation of its meaning; (3) the ability to 
focus on the narrating and, more particularly, on those evaluative 
statements pointing to a narrative lesson; (4) the ability to process 
the narrated in terms of what I have called a contrastive analysis; 
and (5) the ability to generalize the particulars depicted in the world 
of the narrated. Undoubtedly, there is much more to narrative 
competence than what I have said; but what I have said undoubted- 
ly describes part of that competence. 
NOTES 
1. See Vladimir Propp, Morphology of the Folktale (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1958) and Alan Dundes, The Morphology of North American In- 
dian Folktales (Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1964). 
2. Such experiments have actually been devised. See, for example, Teun A. van 
Dijk and Walter Kintsch, «Cognitive Psychology and Discourse. Recalling and 
Summarizing Stories» in Wolfgang Dressler, ed., Current Trends in Textlinguistics 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1977), pp. 61-80; Christine G. Glenn, «The Role of 
Episodic Structure and of Story Length in Children's Recall of Simple Stories,» 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 17 (1978), 229-247; and Jean 
Mandler and Nancy Johnson, «Remembrance of Things Parsed: Story Structure 
and Recall,» Cognitive Psychology, 9 (1977), 111-151. 
3. Cf. Janet Schlauch Knapp, «Narrative Syntax,» Rackham Literary Studies, 
No. 7 (1976), 9-18. 
4. For a partial formalization, see Gerald Prince, «Aspects of a Grammar of Nar- 
rative,» Poetics Today, 2, No. 3 (1980), 49-63. 
5. The amount of narrating per narrative varies considerably and it is sometimes, 
minimal. In this case, reproducing the narrated would not yield very much of a sum- 
mary. 
6. Sometimes, of course, such summarizing is not possible: consider (1), (6) or a 
narrative like «I ate rice then I ate beans.» 
7. On the point of narrative, see William Labov, Language in the Inner City 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972); Livia Polanyi, «Story and 
Text» in D. Tannen, ed., Written and Spoken Language (to appear); and Mary 13
Prince: Understanding Narrative
Published by New Prairie Press
50 STCL., Vol. 6, Numbers 1&2 (Fall, 1981-Spring, 1982) 
Louise Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse (Bloomington: In- 
diana University Press, 1972). 
8. On this subject, see Gerald Prince, «Narrativity» in Karl Menges and Daniel 
Rancour-Laferriere, eds., Axia. Davis Symposium on Literary Evaluation (Stutt- 
gart: Akademischer Verlag, 1982), 61-76. 
9. See Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1961); Gerard Genette, Figures III (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972); Susan 
Rubin Suleiman, «Redundancy and the 'Readable' Text,» Poetics Today, 1, No. 3 
(1980), 119-142; and William Labov, Language in the Inner City, op. cit. 
10. On this subject, see among others A.J. Greimas, Du Sens (Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 1970) and Nomi Tamir-Ghez, «Binary Oppositions and Thematic Decoding,» 
PTL, 3, N°. 2 (1978), 235-248. 14
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 4
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol6/iss1/4
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1626
